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Recently, the United 
States Supreme Court held in 
Commissioner v. Schleier, 115 
S. Ct. 2159 (1995), that awards 
resulting from claims of age 
discrimination under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment 
Act of1967 ("ADEA") may not 
be excluded from gross income 
for purposes of income taxa-
tion. In so holding, the Court 
created a two-prong test which 
must be satisfied before such an 
award may. be excluded from 
gross income. First, the cause 
of action asserted by a taxpayer 
must be sufficiently akin to a 
traditionally recognized tort 
and, second, the resultant dam-
ages awarded must be attribut-
able to a personal injury or sick-
ness. 
Upon reaching the age 
of sixty, Erich E. Schleier 
("Schleier") was terminated 
from his position with United 
Airlines ("United") in accor-
dance with existing company 
policy. Subsequently, Schleier 
filed a claim in the United States 
District Court alleging that, in 
terminating his employment, 
United violated the ADEA. The 
parties eventually entered into 
a settlement agreement in which 
Schleier received $145,629. 
The terms of the settlement 
agreement attributed one-half 
of the award to back wages and 
the other half to liquidated dam-
ages. 
On his 1986 federal in-
come tax return, Schleier re-
ported the back pay portion of 
the award as part of his gross 
income, but excluded the liqui-
dated damages portion of the 
award. After the Commission-
er of the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice ("Commissioner") issued 
a deficiency notice citing 
Schleier for failure to report the 
liquidated damages portion of 
the settlement as gross income, 
Schleier sought relief in the 
Tax Court. Schleier asserted 
that the entire' award should be 
excluded from gross income. 
Relying on 26 U.S.C. § 
104(a)(2), which provides an 
exclusion from gross income 
for damages received "on ac-
count of personal injury or sick-
ness," the Tax Court held that 
the entire settlement was ex-
cludable from gross income. 
The Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit affirmed the deci-
sion of the Tax Court, and the 
Supreme Court granted certio-
rari in order to clarify the uncer-
tainty surrounding the issue of 
taxability of ADEA awards. 
The Court began hs 
analysis by examining the pur-
pose of the ADEA, which was 
enacted to prohibit "arbitrary 
discrimination in the workplace 
based on age." Schleier, 115 S. 
Ct. at 2162 (quoting Lorillard 
v. Pons, 434 US. 575, 577 
(1978); Trans World Airlines, 
Inc. v. Thurston, 469 US. 111, 
120 (1985)). Specifically, cer-
tain defenses notwithstanding, 
the ADEAcondernns the termi-
. nation of any employee between 
the ages of forty and seventy 
"because of such individual's 
age." Id. (quoting29US.C. §§ 
623(a)(1) and631(a)). Aclaim-
ant succeeding in an ADEA 
action may receive a variety of 
awards, including reinstate-
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ment, promotion and back wag-
es. Id. (citing 29 US.c. §§ 
626(b), 216(b)). Additionally, 
a claimant may recover liqui-
dated damages, but "only in 
cases of willful violations" of 
the ADEA by the offending 
employer. Id. (quoting 29 
US.C. § 626(b)). Significant-
ly, the majority noted, unlike 
claims based upon tort law, the 
ADEA "does not permit a sep-
arate recovery of compensato-
ry damages for pain and suffer-
ing or emotional distress." Id. 
(citations omitted). 
In reversing the court of 
appeals, the Supreme Court then 
examined the statutory defini-
tion of "gross income," as well 
as the permissible exclusions 
therefrom. Id. at 2163. The 
Court emphasized that in 26 
US.C. §61(a), "gross income" 
is broadly defined as including 
"all income from whatever 
source derived." I d. Section 
104(a)(2) of the Internal Reve-
nue Code, under which Schleier 
argued his award was exclud-
able, provides several exclu-
sions from gross income, in-
cluding an exclusion for "dam-
ages received ... on account of 
personal injuries or sickness." 
Id. Based upon the plain lan-
guage of the statute, however, 
the Court rejected Schleier's 
position, holding instead that 
neither the back wage portion 
of Schleier' s award, nor the liq-
uidated damages portion fell 
within the purview of the Sec-
tion 104(a)(2) exclusion. Id. at 
2163-64. 
The Court first reasoned 
that Schleier's alleged injury, 
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the termination of his employ-
ment due to his age, did not 
constitute a "personal injury" 
or "sickness" within the mean-
ing of the Section 104(a)(2) 
exclusion. Id. at 2164. As to 
the portion of Schleier' saward 
attributed to back wages, the 
Court held that Section 
104(a)(2) "does not permit the 
exclusion of [Schleier's] back 
wages because the recovery of 
back wages was not 'on ac-
count of any personal injury 
and because no personal injury 
affected the amount of back 
wages recovered." Id. Further-
more, the Court rejected 
Schleier's contention that, his 
back wages notwithstanding, 
the liquidated damages portion 
of his award fell within the Sec-
tion 104(a)(2) exclusion as com-
pensation for personal injuries. 
Id. Relying on its decision in 
Trans World Airlines v. 
Thurston, the Court held that 
"Congress intended for liqui-
dated damages to be punitive in 
nature." Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 
2165 (citing Trans World Air-
linesv. Thurston, 469US. 111, 
125 (1985)). 
Next, the Court exam-
ined Schleier's argument that 
the Commissioner's regulation, 
codified at 26 C.F.R. § 1.104-
1 (c) (1994), interpreting 26 
US.C. § 104(a)(2), provided an 
additional basis upon which his 
award was excludable. Id. at 
2165-66. In part, the regulation 
expands upon exclusions ex-
pressly set forth in Section 
104(a)(2) by interpreting the 
statute as providing an exclu-
sion based bt:oadly upon "tort 
or tort type rights." Id. at2165-
66. In rejecting Schleier's ar-
gument, the Court held that the 
language of the regulation con-
stituted an additional require-
ment which must be met in or-
der for a recovery to be exclud-
able. Not only must a settle-
ment be "on account of person-
al injury or sickness," but it 
must be based upon the asser-
tion of "tort or tort type 
rights." Id. at 2166. 
Finally, the Court con-
sidered Schleier's contention 
that the Court's decision in 
United States v. Burke, 504 
US. 229 (1992), supported the 
argument that ADEA awards 
are excludable from gross in-
come. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 
2166. In Burke, the Court held 
that awards resulting from 
claims of discrimination under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 were not excludable 
from income. Schleier, 115 S. 
Ct. at 2166. The Burke Court 
noted that its decision was 
based, in part, upon the conclu-
sion that the claim asserted 
therein did not rest upon the 
"tort or tort type rights" refer-
enced in the Commissioner's 
regulation interpreting 26 
US.C. § 104(a). Schleier,115 
S. Ct. at 2166. In so holding, 
the Court indicated that it would, 
in fact, recognize a claim based 
upon "tort or tort type rights" 
as excludable from gross in-
come.ld. Accordingly, Schleier 
argued that the ADEA was suf-
ficiently distinguishable from 
Title VII in two critical respects: 
the ADEA, unlike Title VII, 
allows for jury trials, as well as 
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the recovery of liquidated dam-
ages.ld. at 2166. In rejecting 
Schleier's argument, the Court 
held that the distinctions ad-
vanced by Schleier were not 
adequate to bring his claim with-
in the scope of the statutory 
exclusion.ld. at 2166-67. Es-
sentially, the Court concluded 
that an award under the ADEA, 
which is devoid of the broad 
range of compensatory damag-
es available to tort claimants, 
could not be recognized as an 
"action based upon tort type 
rights." Id. at 2167. 
In sum, the Court held 
that even if Schleier had, in 
fact, succeeded in convincing 
the Court that his claim consti-
tuted a tort type action, 
Schleier's claim fell short of 
satisfying the personal injury 
prong of the statute. Id. 
In Part I of her dissent, 
Justice O'Connor, joined by 
Justice Thomas, maintained that 
age discrimination is, in fact, a 
personal injury, and damages 
from such an injury are proper-
1y excludable within the pur-
view of26 U.S.c. § 104(a)(2). 
Id. at 2167-68. Justice 
0' Connor noted that despite the 
view of the majority that Sec-
tion 104(a)(2) offers an exclu-
sion for tangible, as well as in-
tangible injuries, the Court nev-
ertheless held that ADEA 
awards are not excludable, 
hence, suggesting that Section 
104(a)(2) applies only to tangi-
ble personal injuries. Id. at 2168-
69. 
In Part II of her dissent, 
Justice O'Connor, joined by 
Justices Thomas and Souter, 
criticized the majority for its 
departure from precedent and 
noted the Court's previous rul-
ing in Burke that discrimina-
tion constituted a "personal in-
jury." Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 
2169-70. Additionally, Justice 
O'Connor maintained that the 
broad range of remedies avail-
able to ADEA claimants "qual-
ify an ADEA suit as a 'tort type' 
action." Id. at 2170. Lastly, 
Justice 0 'Connor expressed her 
concern for the majority's fail-
ure to consider with appropri-
ate deference the long-standing 
IRS regulation interpreting the 
statute.ld. at 2171-72. 
In Commissioner v. 
The Great Seal of Maryland, first sent from England after colonial settlement, was 
adopted by Joint Resolution in 1876. The reverse shows a shield with the Calvert and 
Crossland arms supported by a farmer and a fisherman. The scroll contains a motto 
usually translated "manly deeds, womanly words." Around the border, the Latin legend 
reads "with favor wilt thou compass us as with a shield." On the bottom, the date, 1632, 
refers to the year Charles I, King of England, granted the Maryland Charter to Cecilius 
Calvert, second Lord Baltimore. The obverse of the Seal shows Lord Baltimore in 
knight's armor riding a stallion. 
Schleier, the Supreme Court 
expressed the view that age dis-
crimination will not be recog-
nized as a personal injury for 
income taxation purposes. 
While not immediately appar-
ent, the impact of the Court's 
decision is far-reaching for all 
parties involved in the ADEA 
claims process. For both indi-
viduals and employers involved 
in an attempt to settle discrim-
inationclaimsundertheADEA, 
the Court's decision will cer-
tainly be a key factor in any 
settlement negotiations, as no 
portion of an ADEA settlement 
is excludable from an individu-
ai's gross income. Hence, in 
the future, it appears that ADEA 
claimants will seek higher mon-
etary settlements in an effort to 
secure a fair net settlement after 
taxation. Thus, it is likely that 
employers involved in the 
ADEA claims process will bear 
the cost of the Schleier deci-
sion. 
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